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JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF PRISONERS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEND
AND RECEIVE MAIL
INTRODUCTION
In the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia stated that the federal bill of rights did not apply to
convicted felons; instead that they were "slaves of the State."'
This notion is certainly antiquated today in many respects. The
Supreme Court of the United States has determined that a number
of rights protected by the first ten amendments apply to prisoners.
2
Nevertheless, prisoners in many state penitentiaries are still denied
the right to send and receive mail without undue interference by
prison officials. Although the first amendment guarantee of free-
dom of speech protects the correspondence of free citizens, courts
have been reluctant to hear prisoners' claims that this guarantee
also applies to them. Generally petitions have been dismissed on
the basis that prison practices are within the administrative discre-
tion of prison officials.3
Recently a number of courts have overcome their traditional
reluctance to consider the issue of the sanctity of mail under the
first amendment. 4 The first part of this Comment will consist of
a brief discussion of the traditional reasons for dismissing actions
concerned with prisoner mail interference. The second part will
review recent cases wherein courts have determined the extent to
which correspondence should freely pass into and out of prisons.
I. THE TRADITIONAL JuDicIAL ATTITUDE
Until recently, petitions by prisoners alleging that interfer-
ence with their mail violated a constitutional right were abruptly
1. Ruffin v. The Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
2. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel applies to prisoners); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964) (prisoners' right to exercise freedom of religion under the first
amendment may not be infringed by prison authorities). See also Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (racial segregation of prisoners is uncon-
stitutional); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prisoners' right of access
to the courts may not be abridged).
3. See notes 5-16 and accompanying text infra.
4. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
dismissed. The courts were unwilling to infringe on matters involv-
ing the administrative discretion of prison officials. This judicial
attitude has been aptly termed the "hands-off" doctrine.5
Stroud v. Swope6 illustrates a typical application of the
"hands-off" doctrine. In this case petitioner Robert Stroud (The
Birdman of Alcatraz) sought to enjoin prison officials from inter-
cepting mail, to and from him, concerning publication of a book
and other related business affairs. The court affirmed the district
court's denial of an injunction. In applying the "hands-off" doc-
trine, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that "it is not
the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and dis-
cipline of prisoners, but only to deliver from imprisonment those
who are illegally confined."7 By applying the "hands-off" doctrine,
the court did not reach the merits of Stroud's complaint. Thus
the prison officials did not have to justify the censorship of ob-
struction of Stroud's correspondence.
The most common argument used by courts to justify the
"hands-off" doctrine is related to the separation of the executive
and judicial branches of government. The judiciary has felt con-
strained to review prisoner complaints because the administration
of prisons is within the province of the executive branch of govern-
ment. Typical of this inhibition is Fulwood v. Clemmer where
federal prison authorities had denied a Black Muslim permission to
correspond with Elijah Muhammed. In Fulwood the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia said:
Congress has committed to prison authorities the regu-
lation and discipline of prisoners convicted of offenses
against the United States [18 U.S.C. § 4042]. Ordinarily
the regulation of the mail of prisoners is a matter within
the administrative discretion of prison officials. Courts
lack general supervisory powers over prisoners, and in the
absence of a showing of a violation of a legal right or of an
abuse of discretion by prison officials a court should not
interfere.9
Although the court stated under what conditions it would act, def-
5. FRITCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 31 (1961). For commentary on
the "hands-off" doctrine see Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Cri-
tique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963) Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. Rrv.
407 (1967); Note, Prison Restrictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CalM. LAW
386 (1968).
6. 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
7. Id. at 851.
8. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
9. Id. at 375 (footnotes omitted). Accord, Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d
986 (9th Cir. 1948). Numer cited the same U.S.C. section in holding that a
prisoner could be denied permission to take a correspondence course in
English. Prison officials withheld permission because the prisoner stated
that he intended to use skills learned in the course to write a book ex-
posing the brutality of the prison authorities.
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erence to the executive branch prevented the court from deciding
whether the plaintiff had made a showing of such conditions.1 0
An additional argument often advanced by courts to explain
their dismissal of prisoner suits is a claimed judicial lack of exper-
tise in penal matters. In Abernathy v. Cunningham," the Fourth
Circuit noted that the professional opinion of prison officials and
their familiarity with prisoners and prison conditions must be
given great weight.12 Such an attitude has the practical effect of
placing all but the most flagrant decisions of prison officials re-
specting the treatment of prisoners beyond the scope of probing
judicial scrutiny.
Prisoners confined in state institutions for violations of state
laws face additional "hands-off" arguments when bringing actions
in federal courts. The federal judiciary's above-noted reluctance
to interfere with administrative decisions is heightened by its re-
spect for the federal system and state autonomy. In Carothers v.
Follette," a New York federal district court succinctly sumrnma-
rized this attitude:
When we are asked to enjoin or revise state prison pro-
cedures our every instinct would be to favor abstention,
particularly if the state had in effect a system of adminis-
trative review, or if difficult questions of state law were
presented. In such instances we should proceed cautiously
for the same reasons that led Congress to require exhaus-
tion of state remedies by a state prisoner seeking release
by writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Maintenance
of workable federal-state relations and economy of effort
would normally be furthered by abstention.
14
This jurisdictional concern 5 presents a formidable obstacle to a
state prisoner's attempt to seek relief in federal court.",
10. For a case permitting correspondence with Elijah Muhammed, see
notes 135-39 and accompanying text infra.
11. 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968).
12. Id. at 779 (plaintiff prisoner was denied permission to receive
various Black Muslim publications). See also Gray v. Creamer, 329 F.
Supp. 418 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
13. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For a detailed discussion of
this case, see notes 30-36 and accompanying text infra.
14. 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (footnote omitted). But
see Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972).
15. Although the details of these jurisdictional issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment, they must be carefully handled by the practi-
tioner. For excellent discussions of this aspect of prisoners' rights cases,
see Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) and Turner,
Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights
Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473 (1971).
16. Cases reflecting general federal court aversion toward actions
brought by state prisoners objecting to mail interference are Evans v.
II. RECENT TREND TOWARD RESTRICTION OF PRISON
OFFICIALS' INTERFERENCE WITH PRISON MAIL
Although the traditional rules have severely limited the pos-
sibility of prisoners obtaining relief from mail censorship, a series
of recent federal decisions indicates a change in judicial thinking
on this subject. These decisions are based on the oft-cited rule of
Coffin v. Reichard17 that "a prisoner retains all the rights of an
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implica-
tion, taken from him by law."' A few courts have been more
willing to examine the restrictions alleged by prisoners and to re-
quire prison officials to justify their use. Decisions which go fur-
thest toward recognizing some semblance of first amendment
rights for prisoners insist that the restrictions imposed on mail be
no greater than is necessary to protect legitimate prison interests
such as security and control. The courts in the forefront of this
trend apologetically reject the "hands-off" doctrine, stating that
present attitudes toward prison reform and prisoner rehabilitation
compel them to do so.'
Discussion of the present trend will be facilitated by treating
four separate types of prisoners' mail: (a) correspondence with
courts; (b) correspondence with attorneys of record; (c) corre-
spondence with public officials; and (d) correspondence with the
general public.
A. Correspondence with Courts
Prisoner actions for relief from mail censorship or obstruction
generally allege violation of first amendment freedom of speech
rights. Where the mail affected is to or from a court, however,
the additional constitutional right of access to the courts arises.20
The rule was first articulated in Ex parte HullI 2 that "the state
Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1972); Krist v. Smith, 439 F.2d 146 (5th
Cir. 1971); Diehl v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1969); Brown v.
Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Morris v.
Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953); Kelly v. Dowd, 140
F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 712 (1944); Jones v. Rouse,
341 F. Supp. 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Gray v. Creamer, 329 F. Supp. 418
(W.D. Pa. 1971); Holland v. Beto, 309 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Argen-
tine v. McGinnis, 311 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States ex rel.
Cobb v. Maroney, 216 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
17. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
18. Id. at 445.
19. For discussion of the relationship of letter writing to rehabilita-
tion, see BARNES AND TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 492 (3d ed.
1959); Leopold, What is Wrong with the Prison System, in THE TASKS OF
PENOLOGY 21 (Perlman and Allington eds. 1969); Note, The Right of Ex-
pression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1967).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "... nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; . . ." This clause protects with special solicitude a state prisoner's
access to courts. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
21. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
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and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to ap-
ply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. '22 Following the
same rationale, the Ninth Circuit in Stiltner v. Rhay 3 mentioned
both state courts and the Civil Rights Act in quoting from an
earlier Ninth Circuit decision, Hatfield v. Bailleaux:
2 4
Reasonable access to the courts is . . . a right . . . guaran-
teed as against state action by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. This includes, specifically, "right
of access by state prisoners to state courts;" and a depriva-
tion of this right is therefore actionable under the Civil
Rights Act. Indeed, reasonable access to the courts is basic
to all other rights protected by the Act, for it is essential
to their enforcement.
25
In Stiltner, the district court had dismissed the plaintiff's com-
plaint which alleged that his petition for habeas corpus had been
denied because prison officials had refused to mail any legal docu-
ments to the state supreme court. The circuit court held that the
complaint alleged a cause of action. 26 Therefore, the rule of Ex
parte Hull has been applied to correspondence directed to all
courts, both state and federal.
Whether the right of access to the courts completely bars such
interference as inspecting and reading mail to and from courts is
an open question. This issue was treated by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Coleman v. Peyton.27 Without discussing the
specific facts of the case, the court affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court that the plaintiff's right of access to the courts had not
been denied.28 However, dicta, in the opinion of Chief Judge
Haynesworth noted that the delay associated with the censorship
and inspection of mail to and from courts was both inappropriate
and unnecessary.- It was stated that courts could certainly be ex-
pected to bring to the attention of prison officials any unauthorized
or objectionable correspondence. Thus the Coleman decision indi-
22. Id. at 549 (prison officials refused to mail Hull's petition for writ
of habeas corpus claiming that its form would not be acceptable to the
court). More recent cases following Hull are Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d
314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 959
(1964) and Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
23. 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920, rehearing
denied, 376 U.S. 959 (1964).
24. 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
25. 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1963) (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 317.
27. 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966).
28. 362 F.2d at 907.
29. Id.
cated that any interference other than sorting and handling was
unwarranted and unjustified.
In Carothers v. Follette,3 ° a New York federal district court
found that a prisoner's right of access to the courts plus the first
amendment right to voice legitimate complaints rendered reading
of petitioner's mail unlawful. It was the practice of defendant
prison officials to read all correspondence directed to courts and
copy all complaints of prison conditions. This was done so that
"prison officials will have advance warning of any possible litiga-
tion that might be instituted against them, and will be able to in-
vestigate the complaint and answer inquiries by the court. '3 1 The
plaintiff was seeking money damages and an injunction restraining
prison officials from censoring his court correspondence.
32
The Carothers court first found that the justification offered
by prison officials for examining mail destined for a court was in-
sufficient. Prisoner complaints forwarded by a judge to prison
officials could be adequately investigated and answered at that
time.8 3 However, the court made it clear that it did not grant an
injunction for this reason alone. Plaintiff proved conclusively that
following the writing of a letter to a judge complaining of harass-
ment he was disciplined for making "false and lying statements to
the court about prison administration. 3 4 The court ruled that this
action "chills the prisoner's exercise of his first amendment right to
voice legitimate complaints."3 5  Although the court in Carothers
30. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
31. Id. at 1020.
32. A civil action for deprivation of rights is provided for in 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1871):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
This provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is generally used to bring
deprivation of rights actions in federal court. Cases holding that prisoners
in state custody are within the protection of the Civil Rights Act are
Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961). For commentary on prisoner use of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 see Note, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: An Emerging Vehicle of Post-
Conviction Relief for State Prisoners, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 596 (1970); Note,
Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270 (1969); Note, Fed-
eral Remedies For Lawfully Committed Prisoners Who Claim Mistreat-
ment, 2 J. PuB. LAw 181 (1953); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in
Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473
(1971); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110
U. PA. L. Ray. 985 (1962).
33. 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. Id. at 1023.
35. Id. at 1022. For another case where reprisals against prisoners
for complaints made to courts were enjoined as infringing on prisoner's




intimated that prison officials could not justify reading mail to and
from courts, it is clear that the holding was based on the disci-
plinary proceedings instituted by the prison officials.36
Opening and reading correspondence between pre-trial detain-
ees and courts would seem to be even more difficult to justify.
Since the detainee has not been found guilty of a crime, he should
not be treated as though he were a convicted prisoner. The justifi-
cation for reading such mail must be based on prison security in-
terests only. Penal objectives such as retribution are inapplicable.
In Palmigiano v. Travisono,8 7 the United States District Court for
Rhode Island recently reviewed the entire procedure followed by
prisons of that state for handling mail. Pre-trial detainees in the
state brought a class action against federal and state prison offi-
cials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under a variety of
federal civil rights statutes. 8
The procedure followed in Rhode Island gave the censoring
officer the "authority to stop any letter that is insulting, fraudu-
lent, threatening or not in good taste, or any letter that casts the
prison in an unfavorable light."39 On the question of shielding
courts from this type of mail, prison officials conceded that they
had no valid reason for so doing.40 The Palmigiano court thus
ruled that mail to and from courts could not be opened.41 The
Rhode Island practice was found to be an infringement of the first
amendment right of freedom of speech and the right to petition for
redress of grievances.4 2 The court rejected the "hands-off" doc-
trine and held that any interference with correspondence between
pre-trial detainees and courts was unjustifiable.
Two recent federal circuit court decisions indicate that the
practice of opening and reading prisoners' mail to courts does not
interfere with the right of access to the courts. In Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis43 the Second Circuit ruled that all correspondence to
36. 314 F. Supp. at 1023.
37. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
38. In Rhode Island, persons awaiting trial for federal offenses were
detained in the Rhode Island correctional system according to a contract
between the state and the federal government. Relief was sought under
28 U.S.C. § 1361 against federal officials and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
state officials.
39. 317 F. Supp. at 784.
40. The Palmigiano court noted that it is not the responsibility of
prison officials to protect the sensibilities of the recipients of prisoners'
mail. 317 F. Supp. at 788.
41. Id. at 784.
42. Id. at 788-9. A case holding the same with respect to pre-trial
detainees is Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
43. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
and from prisoners may be opened and read because that would jus-
tify deleting material from, withholding or refusing to mail commu-
nications with courts. . . . -44 The plaintiff here was seeking relief
from the prison practice of deleting "irrelevant" material from let-
ters to his attorney.45 The court termed letters to courts, attorneys
and public officials "sui generis" and made its ruling applicable to
all three.
46
In Tyree v. Fitsgerald,47 the plaintiff contended that the policy
of opening and reading mail from courts and attorneys to prisoners
violated his right of access to the courts. The First Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of an injunction.
8
The court ruled that the plaintiff had not shown that he would suf-
fer an irreparable injury if the prison practice was not enjoined
immediately. 49 The relief sought by the plaintiff in Tyree limits
the effect of the holding considerably. The decision indicates, how-
ever, that allegation and proof that mail from courts is being read
may not be enough to warrant a finding that the acts of prison offi-
cials infringed on the right of access to the courts.50
Prison officials justify indiscriminate mail inspection and cen-
sorship on the basis that it is necessary to discover contraband,
and escape plans and illegal business dealings.5 1 Protecting courts
from lies and obscenities and giving prison officials notice of pris-
oner complaints are also mentioned. 52 It is submitted that any ra-
tional basis for these justifications disappears if correspondence be-
tween courts and prisoners alone is considered. Courts would not
be a party to an unauthorized scheme, 3 and are better left to pro-
44. Id. at 201. The court did not give any examples of such cases or
special circumstances.
45. For treatment of this aspect of the case, see notes 83-86 and ac-
companying text infra.
46. 442 F.2d at 200 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d
970 (8th Cir. 1965). In Lee, the plaintiff challenged the prison practice of
censoring all letters to public officials except those to the governor, attor-
ney general, commissioner of corrections and warden. The Eighth Cir-
cuit ruled that the prison regulations fell within the bounds of adminis-
trative discretion.
47. 445 F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1971).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 629. However, the court did say that "it may be that prison-
ers are entitled to receive unopened mail from courts, public officials and
attorneys." Id. Thus the harsh ruling can probably be attributed to the
relief plaintiff was seeking-a preliminary injunction.
50. In Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970) and
Rhem v. Magrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); motions for prelimi-
nary injunctions alleging facts similar to Tyree v. Fitzgerald were granted.
See notes 60-65 and 75-78 and accompanying text infra for discussion of
these cases.
51. For discussion of these justifications, see Singer, Censorship of
Prisoner's Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051 (1970).
52. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.




tect themselves from distasteful or untrue communications. 4
Furthermore, the "notice" argument of prison officials was thor-
oughly discredited in Carothers." There is simply no logical justi-
fication for opening and reading mail between prisoners and courts.
The argument for unfettered communications between prison-
ers and courts is even more compelling when the possibility of re-
taliation by prison officials for complaints made to courts is con-
sidered. So long as prison officials are allowed to read such mail,
this possibility exists. In Carothers v. Follette" and Talley v.
Stephens,5" prisoners were able to prove that they were punished
for sending complaints to courts. Undoubtedly, others could be
subjected to more subtle harassment which would be difficult or
impossible to prove. Therefore communications between prisoners
and courts must be free from any scrutiny by prison officials in or-
der to adequately protect both the right of access to the courts and
the right to petition for redress of grievances.
B. Correspondence With Attorneys of Record
Correspondence to and from a prisoner's attorney of record
warrants treatment separate from "court mail. s58 The basis for
preventing interference with attorney-client mail is not the right
of access to the courts, but rather the sixth amendment guarantee
of the right of effective assistance of counsel.5 9 Furthermore, the
likelihood that an attorney will be a party to an illegal scheme is
arguably greater than for a judge. Thus the two topics must be
treated separately.
In its decision concerning mail between pre-trial -detainees and
attorneys, the District Court for Rhode Island in Palmigiano v.
54. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). Although
the issue before the court was whether punishing a prisoner for complaints
made to courts was violative of his right of access to the courts, the district
court commented on the prison practice of withholding petitions to courts
containing obscene, abusive or otherwise objectionable allegations or state-
ments. The court recommended that "all petitions for relief ... be sent
out, regardless of their language or tone [and that the courts be left] to
protect themselves from improper matter, which they can do." Id. at
699, n.4.
55. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
56. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
57. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
58. In this section, discussion will focus on cases where the attorney-
client relationship has been established and this fact is known to the prison
officials.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
Travisono6 held that letters to attorneys may not be opened. Al-
though the holding applied only to pre-trial detainees, the decision
was based on arguments applicable to prisoners generally. Indeed,
the rules set down in Palmigiano have since been uniformly ap-
plied in Rhode Island to both convicted prisoners and pre-trial de-
tainees." Prison officials in Rhode Island read all mail to and
from anyone and stopped any letter that was "insulting, fraudu-
lent, threatening or not in good taste, or ... that casts the prison
in an unfavorable light. '6 2 They contended that attorney-client
mail must be censored because "some attorneys are unscrupulous
and would conspire with client-prisoner for criminal purposes." 63
The Palmigiano court found that not only did the censorship
interfere with the plaintiff's right to effective counsel, but that
private consultation with an inmate's attorney is vital to his access
to the courts. 64 The opportunity for private attorney-client con-
sultation at the prison was recognized by the court. Thus inter-
ference with attorney-client mail would not necessarily destroy
the possibility of a pre-trial detainee's private access to his counsel.
However, the court concluded that the prison officials' justification
for reading attorney-client mail was too speculative and no admin-
istrative penal interest existed to justify any infringement of the
right to counsel.65
Recently, the United States District Court for New Hampshire
followed Palmigiano on the issue of correspondence with attorneys.
In Conklin v. Hancock"6 the court ruled that correspondence be-
tween pre-trial detainees and attorneys of record must be delivered
promptly and unopened to protect the right to counsel.67 The
court so ruled despite a showing by prison authorities that the
plaintiff had a record of escape attempts and prison 'disruption.68
Dictum in the opinion cited Palmigiano for the proposition that
"[Elyen if petitioner were a convicted prisoner, censorship of any
mail to or from his attorney would probably inhibit the sixth
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel and, there-
fore, be prohibited."69 Thus both Palmigiano and Conklin indicate
that the right to counsel, can be fully protected only if attorney-
prisoner mail is free of any interference by prison officials.
60. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
61. Statement of prison officials in Ross v. Affleck, Civil No. 4408
(D.R.I., filed Oct. 6, 1970) noted in Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in
Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473
(1971).
62. 317 F. Supp. at 784 (D.R.I. 1970).
63. Id. at 784.
64. Id. at 789.
65. Id.
66. 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
67. Id. at 1122-3.
68. Id. at 1120. For further discussion of the prisoner's behavior in
Conklin see text accompanying note 150 infra.
69. 334 F. Supp. at 1123.
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In Smith v. Robbins,70 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Maine rendered a decision which both
permits prison officials to inspect mail from attorneys and pro-
tects the confidentiality of such mail. The single issue presented
by the plaintiff-prisoners was "whether an inmate shall be permit-
ted to be present when a prison official opens to inspect for con-
traband incoming mail from an attorney."'7' The Smith court
stated that the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel re-
quires the opportunity for private communications free from third
party interference. 72 Yet inspection of mail from attorneys was
deemed necessary. It was found that permitting prisoners to be
present when mail from attorneys is inspected would not threaten
prison security.7 3 The defendant-prison officials urged the court to
accept a rule permitting inspection by prison officials with a
promise that the mail would not be read. However, evidence pre-
sented by the plaintiffs showed that attorneys would be reluctant
to communicate fully with prisoners under such a rule. The result
would be a "chilling effect" on the inmates' right to effective coun-
sel.74 Thus Maine prisons were ordered to allow prisoners to be
present when mail from their attorneys is being inspected. The
court recognized the interests of the prisoners as well as those of
the prison and arrived at a decision protecting both.
Some courts have indicated that the inspection and reading of
a prisoner's attorney correspondence does not infringe on his right
to counsel as long as private personal interview facilities are avail-
able. In Rhem v. McGrath,75 a class action against prison officials
was brought in behalf of all prisoners, both pre-trial detainees and
convicts, confined at the Manhattan House of Detention ("The
Tombs"). Pursuant to this action plaintiffs sought a preliminary
injunction preventing prison officials from opening mail from at-
torneys. The Rhem court found that opening such mail to inspect
for contraband did not deprive prisoners of their constitutional
rights if prisoners and attorneys had available to them facilities for
70. 328 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Me. 1971).
71. Id. at 164.
72. Id. The court cited Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952) for the statement that "an ac-
cused does not enjoy the aid of effective counsel if he is denied the right of
private consultation with him." Id. at 757.
73. 328 F. Supp. at 165. The court pointed out that the prison pro-
cedure for distribution of legal mail could easily accommodate prisoner
presence at the time of inspection. Under the procedure followed by the
prison, prisoners came to the warden's office to receive legal mail. It
was delivered to the prisoners in segregation.
74. 328 F. Supp. at 165.
75. 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
private face-to-face consultation.7" Evidence presented indicated
that prison officials were often present at prisoner-attorney meet-
ings. Therefore the Rhem court enjoined "defendants from inter-
fering with private consultation between plaintiffs and their coun-
sel in this and other cases in which the Commissioner of Correc-
tions, or his staff, are parties.""7 Inspection of mail from attorneys
could continue so long as some other means of private consultation
was provided.78
In Ramer v. United States,79 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the prison practice of opening and reading prisoner-
attorney mail did not amount to interference with the right to
counsel. Defendant Ramer contended that a charge of escape from
federal prison should be dismissed because of interference with his
right to counsel while he was awaiting trial on the escape charge.
The court in Ramer noted that both the accused and his attorney
knew of the surveillance.8 0 Furthermore, there was no evidence
that the contents of the correspondence had been communicated to
the prosecution8l The Ramer court also pointed out that private
consultation facilities were available at the prison. It was con-
cluded that the prison practice was justified for security reasons
and did not interfere with the right to effective counsel.8 2 This
view of the attorney-prisoner mail issue permits prison officials
to open and, if the contents are not communicated to others, read
prisoner-attorney correspondence so long as some means of private
consultation is provided for attorney-client conferences.
Related to the issue of simply reading attorney-client mail is
the question of censoring letters to attorneys. In Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis 3 officials were authorized to delete any "objectionable"
material. Objectionable material was considered anything which
"in [the warden's] judgment was not relevant to Sostre's appeal.18 4
This practice was applied to correspondence from the plaintiff to
his counsel of record on his appeal from conviction. The war-
den's only justification for such censorship was that it was an ex-
ercise of his administrative discretion and duty to prevent improper
correspondence.
76. Id. at 691. The defendants alleged that mail was never read and
the court found no evidence to the contrary.
77. Id. at 691.
78. Id.
79. 411 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1969).
80. Id. at 37.
81. Id. But see Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1967) where
plaintiff proved that a letter to his attorney had been opened, read, and
communicated to the attorney general. Held: No prejudice to the plain-
tiff's case could be inferred from this; the law allows prisons to so act.
82. 411 F.2d at 37. See also Hass v. United States, 344 F.2d 56 (8th
Cir. 1965), wherein the Court emphasized the availability of alternative
means of private communication.
83. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
84. Id. at 187.
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The Sostre court held that the right to seek redress of griev-
ances must be protected from "the reality or chilling threat of ad-
ministrative infringement."8   Censorship was held justifiable only
when the deleted material concerns an improper scheme such as
escape. The court concluded that striking material which officials
deemed irrelevant, repetitious, false, or malicious was improper.8 6
However, the court did allow prison officials to read all incoming
and outgoing mail to check for unlawful schemes.
8 7
The present state of the law on the issue of interference with
attorney-prisoner mail is obviously unsettled; it ranges from com-
plete prohibition to approval with a middle ground which considers
the availability of consultation facilities. It is submitted that read-
ing attorney-prisoner mail impedes such communication and seri-
ously affects the right to effective counsel. The contention that
the availability of facilities for private personal consultation re-
moves this impediment is unrealistic. An attorney should not be
forced to visit the prison every time he wants to be assured that
confidential information does not fall into the hands of the defense
or prosecution. If he is unable to afford the time to make personal
visits, the attorney is forced to either risk the discovery of the in-
formation or forego discussion of it altogether. Either alternative
results in threatened or actual infringement of the rights to effec-
tive counsel.
It is further submitted that the standard reasons for opening
and reading prisoner-attorney communication are too speculative
to justify the consequent infringement of prisoners' sixth amend-
ment rights. The likelihood of an attorney sending contraband to
a prisoner or being a party to an unlawful scheme is remote to say
the least. Courts have stated that assuring that the attorney is a
member in good standing of a state bar association sufficiently pro-
tects the interest of prison security. s8 To guard against efforts to
85. Id. at 200.
86. Id. at 201.
87. A recent case applying the "hands-off" doctrine to a prison where
letters addressed to attorneys were withheld because prison officials re-
garded them as obscene, was Rhinehart v. Rhay, 314 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.
Wash. 1970). Prison regulations provided that letters which contained
vulgar or obscene matter or criticism of the institution could not be sent
to anyone. Under this regulation, prison officials intercepted a number of
plaintiff's letters to his attorney which related incidents of sodomy in the
prison. The court held that this matter was extraneous to the prisoner's
habeas corpus proceeding and his right to counsel was not infringed.
314 F. Supp. at 83.
88. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 789 (D.R.I.
1970) and Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (D.N.H. 1971).
pass unauthorized mail by placing the return address of an attor-
ney on the envelope, a means of secretly marking authentic attor-
ney-prisoner mail could easily be devised.
The procedure ordered in Smith v. Robbins"9 permitting a
prisoner to be present when mail from his attorney is inspected
would seem to sufficiently protect the interests of both prisoners
and prisons. However, implementation of this procedure might
prove burdensome to prison administration. If this is the case, the
dubious justification for opening and reading attorney-prisoner
mail must yield to the real danger of infringement of the right to
effective counsel.
C. Correspondence To Public Officials
The courts have generally applied the same rules to corre-
spondence with public officials that they apply to correspondence
to the courts. Although mail to a public official or legislative
representative usually deals with general prison conditions while
mail to courts relates to the rights of a specific prisoner, the argu-
ments favoring the free flow of the latter apply equally to the for-
mer. In both instances, the correspondence is directed to persons
whose responsibility it is to receive and respond to citizen com-
plaints and grievances. An important policy consideration that
arises in the case of mail to public officials should be noted, how-
ever. The purpose served by unfettered communications with pub-
lic officials, especially legislative representatives, is related to a
fundamental democratic principle that these individuals have a
duty to be fully informed on matters for which they are responsi-
ble. This policy consideration and the fact that mail to public offi-
cials is often intercepted and returned rather than censored and
passed on distinguishes these cases from "court mail" cases.
In Landman v. Royster9 ° the basis of the claim of one of the
plaintiffs in a class action against officials of the Virginia Penal
System was that he had not been permitted to correspond with a
state senator about penitentiary conditions.9 1 Judge Merhige,
speaking for the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, said:
The Court can conceive no interest that the State's execu-
tive arm might have in keeping whatever information
penitentiary inmates have out of the hands of lawmakers.
• . . No witness has suggested one. Interruption of mail
to public officials infringes upon the First Amendment
right of prisoners and likewise the right of legislators to be
informed.
9 2
89. 328 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Me. 1971). See notes 70-74 and accom-
panying text supra.
90. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
91. Id. at 635.
92. Id. at 657 (citations omitted). For similar recognition of the
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Judge Merhige enjoined the defendants from prohibiting letters to
public officials which are critical of prison officials 3
Since letters to public officials will generally involve com-
plaints about prison conditions, the arguments in favor of barring
prison officials from opening and reading mail to the court are also
relevant here.94 Indeed, a few recent decisions have completely
prohibited interference with mail to both public officials and
courts.95 It is submitted that reading mail sent to public officials
is as unjustifiable as reading mail to judges and has the same po-
tential for silencing prisoner complaints. Full protection of the
prisoner's right to petition for redress of grievance and the public
official's right (and duty) to be well informed can only be as-
sured by prohibiting the opening and reading of letters to public
officials.
D. General Correspondence
Recent actions brought by prisoners have resulted in judicial
review of prison practices related to mail intended for various re-
cipients who do not fit into the above categories. 98 Among these
intended recipients are civil liberties unions and members of the
prisoner's family. Considerations involved in determining what
rules should be applied to mail in this category differ from those
discussed in the first three categories in a number of ways. With
the exception of letters seeking legal advice sent to organizations
such as the civil liberties unions, the arguments available to prison-
ers for protection of "legal" or "public officials" mail are not ap-
plicable to general mail.9 7 In the case of general mail, prisoners
rights of persons who wish to correspond with prisoners, see Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D.R.I. 1970).
93. 333 F. Supp. at 657. See also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1971) where a letter from plaintiff to a postal inspector, com-
plaining of the prison practice of not returning to prisoners receipts for
certified mail, was returned to the plaintiff. This was held by the Sostre
court to be improper, although mail to public officials was not discussed
beyond a statement that it is treated in the same manner as mail to courts
and attorneys.
94. See text accompanying notes 51-57 supra.
95. See Palmgiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970);
Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
96. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Car-
others v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
97. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). Here a letter that plaintiff directed to a federal committee
studying difficulties of indigent defendants accused of federal crimes was
returned to him. The Thompson court held that since no infringement of
the right of access to courts or the right to counsel was alleged, plaintiff
had not stated a cause of action.
must rely on basic first amendment rights to prevent interference.
Furthermore, the threat to prison security through the passage of
contraband and escape plans is more plausible. These cases gen-
erally involve an attempt by a prisoner to remove a complete ban
on mail to certain parties.9 8 They do not contend that this corre-
spondence should be free from inspection or unread. Cases to be
discussed in this section concern correspondence to (1) the news
media, (2) civil liberties organizations, (3) religious leaders and (4)
family and friends.
1. Correspondence to the news media
A regulation at a Massachusetts prison totally banned cor-
respondence to the news media concerning prison affairs. In Nolan
v. Fitzpatrick,99 plaintiffs challenged this ban alleging violation of
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right to petition
for redress of grievances. 100 Plaintiffs did not object to defendants
opening and reading all letters to the press. The First Circuit held
that absent a state of extreme tension and danger in the prison a
ban on communications with the press could not be justified. 10 1
The first issue raised in Nolan was whether prisoners retain
the first amendment right to send letters to the press. Noting the
survival of other constitutional rights such as access to the
courts,0 2 and the free exercise of religious beliefs, 0 3 Judge Coffin,
speaking for the court, stated that:
. . . the condition of our prisons is an important matter of
public policy as to which prisoners are, with their wardens,
peculiarly interested and peculiarly knowledgeable. The
argument . . . [favoring the right to send letters to the
press] . . . is . . . buttressed by the invisibility of prisons
to press and public: the prisoners' right to speak is en-
hanced by the public right to know.
0 4
On this basis, it was concluded that the right to communicate with
the press certainly did survive incarceration.
Judge Coffin then considered whether state interests unrelated
to free expression warranted approval of the prison regulation.
Applying the standards set down in United States v. O'Brien,10 5
98. Standard procedure at most prisons limits the number of persons
to whom a prisoner may correspond to about ten. Letters are often with-
held because the addressee is not on the prisoner's approved list.
99. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
100. Id. at 547.
101. Id. at 551.
102. E.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
103. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
104. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 547-8 (1st Cir. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
105. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Defendant was convicted of burning his draft
card. He appealed, contending inter alia that the law under which he
was convicted was an infringement on "symbolic speech" protected by
the first amendment. The court held that governmental regulation of
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the Nolan court examined whether the state interests involved in
withholding letters to newspapers were "important or substantial'
and whether the restriction imposed was "no greater then is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest."1 06 The primary interest
related to prison administration was found to be prison security
and the maintenance of order. 107 The defendants argued that let-
ters sent to newspapers would return to prisons in the form of let-
ters to the editor or news stories and incite prisoners to riot. The
court reasoned that prisoners are already exposed to criticism of
the penal system from fellow inmates and publications coming into
the prison, thus only an inflammatory letter returning to the
prison during a period of abnormal tension among inmates would
warrant interference with the letter. The court concluded that if
such a letter created a "clear and present danger" of violence or
breach of security "prison officials could refuse to admit the issue
of the newspaper in which the letter was contained."'10 8
The defense offered no arguments relating to state interests in
the penal objectives of restraint, deterrence, retribution and re-
habilitation. The Nolan court nevertheless examined these to de-
termine if they justified the prohibition of letters to newspapers.
The court first dismissed the restraint objective on the basis that
any escape plans could easily be discovered when the letter was
read by the prison censors.10 9 The court then found that although
a ban on writing to the press might have both a deterrent and re-
tributive effect, "the important question is . . . whether the use of
this ban is essential to achieving those effects.""I 0 It was held that
there was no evidence to show that the total restriction was essen-
tial to achieving these penal objectives."' With respect to rehabil-
itation, the court ruled that the weight of modern opinion com-
pelled the holding that rehabilitation is not hampered but en-
conduct is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to suppression of free ex-
pression; and if incidental restriction on the alleged first amendment free-
dom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id.
at 372.
106. 451 F.2d at 548.
107. Id. at 548-9. The court also mentioned the danger that newsmen
would assist in escape attempts and contraband trafficking, but found that
opening and reading mail would guard against this. Id. at 549. Minimiz-
ing administrative expenses was deemed an insubstantial interest of the
state. Id. at 549-50.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 550.
110. Id. at 550-1.
111. Id. at 551.
hanced "by permitting the prisoner to retain or develop an oppor-
tunity to express his ideas." 112
Perhaps the most significant portion of the Nolan opinion was
the application to the case of the doctrine against prior restraints
of expression. Briefly, the doctrine holds that prior restraints of
expression accomplished by means of injunctions or the enforce-
ment of laws are in direct conflict with the first amendment. Prior
restraints will only be permitted where the government has met
the heavy burden of showing that a clear and present danger of
riot or disorder will otherwise result. 11 Absent such a showing,
ordinary criminal sanctions are regarded as the proper method to
treat improper use of the free expression right. It is apparent that
regulations restricting prisoner mail are prior restraints. The
court in Nolan only mentioned the doctrine and noted that restrict-
ing expression for fear of its consequences when it returns to the
prison in newspapers is "in a sense, prior to a prior restraint.
'" 11 4
The issue may well appear in future cases involving prisoner's
rights to free expression for its relevance to such situations is quite
clear.
The opinion in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick is extremely well-rea-
soned. It could serve as a model for future decisions on censorship
of prisoner's mail. The Nolan court first established that the right
to send letters to newspapers was retained by prisoners. After
examining every basis which was or might have been asserted to
justify denying this right, the court concluded that no interest of
the prison justified a prohibition of sending letters concerning
prison conditions to newspapers. 115
2. Correspondence seeking legal assistance
Although correspondence with attorneys of record has often
been subject to scrutiny and censorship by prison officials, it is
generally conceded that it may not be withheld." 6 On the other
hand, letters seeking legal assistance have been withheld. Thus,
112. Id. For general commentary on prisoners' rights and these four
penal objectives, see Note, The Right of Free Expression in Prison, 40 S.
CAL. L. REv. 407 (1967); and Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Cri-
tique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963).
113. A thorough discussion of the doctrine was presented in Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also New York Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
114. 451 F.2d at 549.
115. Id. at 551. The court noted that new prison regulations enacted
since the action began permitted mail to be sent out without restriction as
to addressees. The court stated that this "does not moot the issue, since
the policy can at any time be changed." Id.
116. To withhold mail to attorneys of record would almost certainly be
a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
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before the decisions discussed herein, this class of mail was treated
as general non-legal correspondence.
In Nolan v. Scafati"17 and Burns v. Swenson,"" the issue
raised was whether a prisoner could be prevented from seeking le-
gal assistance from the Massachusetts and American Civil Liberties
Unions. The court in Nolan first cited Ex parte HulU" 9 for the
proposition that prisoners cannot be denied access to the courts.
1 20
The court's reasoning then progressed to Johnson v. Avery,
2'
wherein the Supreme Court had reviewed the propriety of prison-
ers' assisting fellow inmates with legal matters such as post-con-
viction appeals and announced that a corollary to the right of ac-
cess was the right to obtain assistance in preparing communications
with the courts. Drawing from the rationale of Johnson v. Avery,
the Nolan court held that absent a "countervailing interest," this
right could not be abridged and it applied to civil actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983122 as well as post conviction appeals.
23
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Burns v. Swenson1
2 4
affirmed a lower court ruling 25 that prohibition of mail to the
American Civil Liberties Union was unlawful as a denial of access
to courts. However, the court in Burns did caution that the in-
terests of prison security and orderly administration required that
such mail be subjected to reasonable regulation. 12 6 The court in-
dicated that any regulation which is aimed at protecting prison
security and does not deny access to counsel is reasonable. 2 7
In McDonough v. Director of Patuxent"28 plaintiff sought to
have a ban removed on mail to a psychiatrist and "Playboy" maga-
zine. He alleged that he was seeking legal assistance and financing
for expert medical testimony to prove that he was no longer a "de-
fective delinquent." The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reiter-
ated its recognition of a prisoner's right of access to the courts, cit-
117. 430 F.2d 548 (lst Cir. 1970).
118. 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
119. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
120. 430 F.2d 548, 550-1 (1st Cir. 1970).
121. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
122. Most prisoner actions alleging deprivation of a right are brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See note 32 supra.
123. 430 F.2d at 551. The only defense alleged by the state was that
the correspondence contained "lies." Id. n.4.
124. 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
125. Burns v. Swenson, 300 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
126. 430 F.2d at 777 (8th Cir. 1970).
127. Id.
128. 429 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1970).
ing language from its opinion in Coleman v. Peyton.129 It was
noted that the determination of defective 'delinquency status was
essentially based on expert testimony. Thus the right of access to
the courts could only be protected in this case if plaintiff had the
opportunity to obtain the services of a psychiatrist and financial
assistance for these services.18 0 The McDonough court extended
the protection to any correspondence reasonably related to legal
action and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
plaintiff's letters to his psychiatrist and "Playboy" were truly in-
tended to solicit assistance for a redetermination of his defective
delinquency status. 131
Since the prisoner's right of access to the courts is well estab-
lished and protected by the judiciary, it is reasonable to expect
that correspondence seeking legal assistance will be accorded the
same protection given to correspondence with attorneys of record.
The attitudes of the courts in the cases discussed above is sum-
marized by the conclusion in Nolan v. Scafati:
3 2
That prison inmates do not have all the constitutional
rights of citizens in society-and may hold some consti-
tutional rights in diluted form-does not permit prison of-
ficials to frustrate vindication of those rights which are en-
joyed by inmates, or to be the sole judge-by refusal to
mail letters to counsel-to determine which letters assert
constitutional rights.133
3. Correspondence with religious leaders
Actions involving regulation of mail to religious leaders have
generally been brought by Black Muslims who have been forbid-
den to correspond with their prophet, Elijah Muhammed. Most
decisions have dismissed such complaints, on the basis of the
"hands-off" doctrine.1
4
In Walker v. Blackwell,"3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
spoke to this issue, stating that to justify the deprivation of a con-
stitutional right "the government must show, a compelling and
substantial public interest requiring the subjection of the right."'I3
The defendant contended that correspondence with Elijah Mu-
hammed should be prohibited because he had served time in prison
and because Catholics were not permitted to write the Pope.1
37
129. 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966).
See notes 27-9 and accompanying text supra.
130. 429 F.2d 1189, 1193 (4th Cir. 1970).
131. Id. at 1194.
132. 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
133. Id. at 551.
134. See, e.g., Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964)
and Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
135. 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969).
136. Id. at 25.
137. Id. at 29.
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The court dismissed the latter argument as being of "questionable
constitutional merit."'18  Additionally, it was found that although
the defendants had not proved that Elijah Muhammed had served
time, even if they had this alone would not disqualify him from be-
ing the recipient of prisoner correspondence. Thus no compelling
interest justifying the restriction was found and the court ordered
that plaintiff be allowed to seek spiritual advice by correspondence
with Elijah Muhammed.139
The validity of official prohibition of letters to religious lead-
ers is constitutionally questionable on both freedom of religion and
freedom of speech grounds. Clearly these rights are not unre-
stricted. They may be infringed upon if a "compelling state in-
terest" is presented by prison officials. However, the Walker de-
cision clearly rejected the "hands-off" doctrine and placed the bur-
den on prison officials to show a compelling interest justifying in-
terference with mail from prisoners to religious leaders.
4. Correspondence with family and friends
Courts have been most reluctant to interfere with the discre-
tion of prison officials respecting regulations governing correspond-
ence with family and friends.140 Regulations generally limit the
number of persons to whom a prisoner can write.'4 ' The persons
who appear on the prisoner's correspondent list must meet certain
qualifications. For example, generally ex-convicts will not be ap-
proved as correspondents. 142 However, a few recent decisions have
examined such regulations.
The leading case in this area is Palmigiano v. Travisono.141
The rules set out by the Palmigiano court encompass both incoming
and outgoing general mail. The Palmigiano court permitted in-
coming mail to be opened and inspected for contraband such as
drugs and weapons and read for the purpose of detecting hard core
pornography. 44 As to the inspecting and reading of outgoing
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Jones v. Rouse, 341 F. Supp. 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971).
141. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
142. See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969).
143. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970). See notes 37-42 and accompanying
text supra.
144. 317 F. Supp. at 790. The court's desire to protect prisoners from
all unwarranted censorship is reflected in the fact that the court's opinion
required prison censors to have an understanding of and follow the defi-
nition of pornography set out in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
mail, the argument of prison officials that this was necessary to in-
sure prison security was rejected on the rationale that any com-
munication of escape plans, or other unlawful schemes posing a
threat to prison security could still be passed in private conversa-
tions with prison visitors.1 4 5  The Palmigiano court ruled that
opening and reading a prisoner's outgoing mail was unnecessary
and violative of his first amendment rights. The court held that
prison officials can only do so after procuring a search warrant. 146
Thus, the Palmigiano court found that under normal conditions
freeing outgoing mail from official scrutiny would not result in
any greater threat to prison security than exists under present vis-
itation rules.
47
In Conklin v. Hancock, 4 8 a New Hampshire federal district
court held that prison officials should be permitted to open and in-
spect the outgoing and incoming mail of a pre-trial detainee if it
is shown that he has a past record of escape attempts. The plain-
tiff alleged, inter alia, that letters to a professor of pharmacology
and a newspaper reporter were not mailed by prison authorities.
49
The subject of these letters was the crime that the plaintiff had al-
legedly committed. Defendant prison officials presented ample
evidence that plaintiff was a "very bad custodial risk" with a long
record of assaults on other inmates and scuffles with guards. 50
They stated that the letters were not sent because the addressees
were not on the prisoner's approved list.
Although the Conklin court cited Palmigiano v. Travisono,'51
with approval, it was found that plaintiff's past record of escape
attempts justified the opening and reading of all mail, other than
that directed to public officials and plaintiff's attorney of record,
to check for escape plans. 52 Having closely examined the facts of
the case, the Conklin court concluded that the prison officials had
shown special circumstances which justified inspection of the gen-
eral correspondence of this pre-trial detainee. 15 3
145. 317 F. Supp. at 791.
146. Id. The search warrant requirement has been recommended by a
number of legal scholars. See, e.g., Singer, Censorship of Prisoner's Mail
and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051, 1055 (1970).
147. Palmigiano also contained dicta questioning the practice of Rhode
Island prisons and most penal systems throughout the country which limits
the number of persons to whom a prisoner may write. The only justifica-
tion seen by the court for such a restriction was the limitation imposed by
the man power and facilities of the prison. 317 F. Supp. at 791.
148. 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
149. Id. at 1120.
150. Id.
151. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
152. 334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
153. For a recent case where the court found that prison officials' alle-
gations that mail privileges to persons other than one's immediate family
and attorney of record would hamper prison security and discipline were
sufficient to so limit the privileges of pre-trial detainees, see Seals v. Man-
son, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (D. Conn. 1971).
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In Carothers v. Follette,6 4 prison officials had refused to mail
a letter to a prisoner's parents which criticized the prison admin-
istration and disciplined him for making the accusations. In for-
mulating a test for determining whether restriction of a prisoner's
right of free expression is justifiable, the court ruled that the re-
striction must be related both reasonably and necessarily to prison
security or prisoner rehabilitation. 155 The Carothers court men-
tioned escape plans and illegal schemes as matters that would
threaten prison security and justify retention by prison officials. 56
Evidence disclosed, however, that no such matter was contained in
the letter in question and thus it did not pose a threat to prison
security.' 57 With respect to rehabilitation, the Carothers court
cited Jackson v. Goodwin'"8 for the proposition that:
[T] o the extent that prison regulations are designed to
teach the prisoners to live in conformity with the norms of
society, the sporadic and discretionary enforcement of un-
reasonable regulations, it appears to us, is more likely to
breed contempt of the law than respect for, and obedience
to it. Unrestricted, arbitrary and unlawful treatment of
prisoners would eventually discourage prisoners from co-
operating in their rehabilitation.' 9
The court in Carothers concluded that correspondence with out-
siders fosters rehabilitation and efforts to discourage a prisoner's
initiative and concern for events within retards rehabilitation.
60
Prison officials were therefore enjoined from withholding mail
such as plaintiff's letter to his parents. The Carothers court, like
other courts which have felt compelled to limit restrictions on
prisoner correspondence, placed great importance on the relation-
ship between rehabilitation and free expression.
That prisoners cannot be given complete freedom from prison
interference with incoming and outgoing mail is a fact of life which
must be recognized. It is thus important to stress that prisoners
protesting restrictions on general mail do not contend that they
should have complete freedom. They only ask that complete pro-
hibitions be eliminated. As the decisions discussed above indicate,
154. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
155. Id. at 1024. With respect to punishing a prisoner for violation of
a justifiable regulation, the court held that this could only be done if the
prisoner breached the regulation or acted so as to constitute a clear and
present danger of breaching the regulation. Id.
156. Id. at 1024.
157. Id. at 1025.
158. 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (Denying black inmates the right to
receive black publications while permitting white inmates to receive white
publications held to be a denial of equal protection of the laws).
159. 400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 1968), cited at 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1025.
160. 314 F. Supp. at 1025.
complete prohibitions usually are not necessary to insure prison
stability. They amount to restrictions on freedom of expression
greater than are necessary to protect prison security. Where, as
in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,1 6 1 correspondence which normally presents
no danger to prison security is seen as being dangerous under cer-
tain prison conditions, provisions can be made for emergency re-
strictions. As prison restrictions are limited to only those which
are necessary to protect prison security, most blanket prohibitions
on correspondence will be eliminated.
III. CONCLUSION
The task of balancing the correspondence rights of prisoners
with the necessity for order and security in prisons is difficult.
Courts must reach conclusions of fact and law on matters where
the consequences of easing restrictions are, for the most part,
speculative.
However, the judiciary must not avoid delineating the rights of
prisoners by hiding behind the "hands-off" doctrine. Prison offi-
cials must be compelled to justify restrictions on correspondence.
Information must be made available to courts which will reduce
the speculation which is so much a part of decisions relating to
prisoners' correspondence rights.16 2 The courts must take judicial
notice of the tense, hostile mood pervading prisons today and rec-
ognize that the present system needs reforming.
Restrictions which unnecessarily limit a prisoner's contact with
the outside contribute to his feelings of social alienation and hos-
tility and are therefore counterproductive. The court in Palmigi-
ano v. Travisono1 3 noted that:
[L] etter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the out-
side world, helps to hold in check some of the morbidity
and hopelessness produced by prison life and isolation,
stimulates his more natural and human impulses, and
otherwise makes contributions to better mental attitudes
and reformation.
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The courts must take judicial notice of the tense, hostile mood
pervading prisons today and recognize that the present system
needs reforming.
WILLIAM C. GIERAScH
161. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
162. The liberal rules set up in Rhode Island by Palmigiano v. Travi-
sono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970) will provide much data. Furthermore,
an experiment is being conducted at the Manhattan House of Detention
wherein outgoing mail is not opened. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681,
690, n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
163. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
164. Id. at 786; citing Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S.
CAL. L. REV. 407, 418 (1967).
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